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Conversion to Islam is an ongoing phenomenon in the minority Kalash 
community in Pakistan. This article covers conversion incidents and their 
narration. The introduction of Islam alters the lives of the “kafir” [i.e., 
unbelievers in Islam] Kalash. The researcher’s intention was to discover the 
motivational factors behind the decision to convert as depicted through 
conversion narratives. Are converts under pressure from the social sphere to 
change religion, or it is an independent decision? How does the Islamic faith 
reach them? What differences do they find in their new faith as compared to the 
old one? Moreover, how do they adjust in the community? The data was 
collected from randomly selected converts whose personal narratives were 
recorded and transcribed. Later, the researcher analyzed the data. In this study, 
narrative is presented as a framework for understanding the individual converts. 
In the analysis, the commonalities and differences in converts’ perceptions of 
their new religion are discussed, as well as the trajectory of their faith 
alteration, their efforts of adjustment, and socio-economic development around 
the Kalash and its impact on the conversions.  
 
 
Say: O disbelievers! I worship not that which ye worship;  
Nor worship ye that I worship. And I shall not worship  
that which ye worship. Nor will ye worship that which I worship.  
Unto you your religion and unto me my religion. (Al-Quran, 109:1–6) 
 
And if thy Lord willed, all who are in the earth would 
 have believed together. Wouldst thou (Muhammad) compel 
men until they are believers? (Al-Quran, 10:99) 
 
The present research is a study of conversion narratives (from 
traditional beliefs to Islam) of the Kalash people of Pakistan. The 
converts’ conversion stories serve as the source of data. These stories 
include their conversion incidents, pre-conversion, and post-conversion 
lives. Very little research has been done in the area of the conversion of 
 




the Kalash, which is the reason that the attempt has been made to discover 
the worldviews related to the conversion process. The intention is to 
understand how conversion has changed their identity, what the socio-
economic undercurrents are, what has influenced them to convert, and 
what efforts they have made to adjust in their community.  
There are a number of growing religious movements in Pakistan. 
The Islahi jamma’at, for example, are a devoted group of Muslims who 
believe in the spread of Sufi ideas from the perspective of the spiritual 
interpretation of Islamic values. The teachings of a Sufi saint, Sultan 
Bahoo, hold a central place. Ahl-e-Sunnat is a major denomination of 
Islam, whose followers interpret Islamic values from the life of the 
Prophet Muhammad along with acknowledging the four Imams who 
gathered the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and interpreted his 
teachings. Followers of Shia, another sect of Islam, believe in twelve pure 
Imams who took the hereditary responsibility of guiding the Muslims 
after the prophet Muhammad. Tehreek-e Minhajul Quran, led by religious 
scholar Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri, aims to bring radical changes in politics. 
Jama’at-e-Islami a predominantly Sunni organization founded by 
Modudi, is a major political party. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a militant anti-
Shia organization, a sub-branch of Sipah-e-Sahaba. Then there is the 
Tablighi Jama’at, a predominantly Sunni denomination, which takes the 
Quran and the life of the prophet Muhammad as the ultimate model for 
the interpretation of Islamic values. Naturally, every denomination of 
Islam wants increase the followers among their ranks. Among these 
movements, however, only the Tablighi Jama’at organizes 
conversion/proselytizing missions to different places throughout the 
country and outside it. Bringing Muslims back to fundamentals and 
converting non-Muslims is something the followers of Tablighi Jama’at 
strive for.  
Islam reaches potential converts through “people, institutions, or 
groups” (Rambo, 1993). The converts’ stories highlight these institutions 
and groups. They tell about the separation of the individual’s identity 
from the mainstream social script. Conversion is an important incident: its 
narration helps in “sense-making” and is integral to the identity creation 
process (Maruna, 2001). These life stories are chronological (they are 
representations of sequences of events), they are meaningful, and they are 
inherently social; they are produced for a specific audience (Elliott, 
2005). 
Many newspapers have reported forced conversions and their 
effects on the community, resulting in some isolated incidents of violence 
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where the locals, allegedly non-Kalash, burned effigies built by the 
Kalash. Efforts to preserve Kalash culture are already going on; some 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been working in the area 
to maintain their religious and cultural status. Islamic missionaries work 
to convert the Kalash, whereas NGOs try to help them maintain their 
traditional ways. 
The followers of Islam consider themselves superior to all other 
religions because Islamic discourse calls itself “true” and “last.” Islam 
enforces the idea of the last true religion far more than other monotheistic 
religions or any other religions. Therefore, the converts sometimes 
reinforce this superiority by saying that the conversion has elevated their 
social status, but this is not a major motivation behind conversions.  
 
 
Figure 1. Maps showing 
the area where the research 
was conducted (the name of 
the province “NWFP” was 
changed to Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa (KPK) in 2010). 
 
 
Faith, Identity, and Narrative 
 
We live in a world where identity matters. It matters both as a 
concept, theoretically, and as a contested fact of contemporary political 
life. The word identity itself has acquired a huge contemporary resonance, 
inside and outside the academic world (Gilroy, 1997, p. 1). Identity is 
amorphous. It is like a marking on a totem or a genetic code. For the most 
part, identity is a semi-unconscious acceptance of the norm. Identity helps 
to recognize those attributes that a person shares with the rest. It also 
 




recognizes differences among individuals, by which a person is accepted 
as a member of the society. Identity is a sense of location in a culture. It is 
a place where persons categorize themselves as different individuals.  
Interestingly, the identity of an individual breaks down into many 
different identifiers. These identifiers include gender, climate, ethnicity, 
geography, politics, caste system, history, language, nationality, religious 
beliefs, sexual orientation, culture, traditions, economics, race, aesthetics, 
likes, and dislikes. Similarly, ethnic identity consists of people who share 
common individual possessions, a common culture, language, ancestors, 
and often a common religion. It also includes geographical characteristics 
that play their part to create a certain ethno-geographical individual 
(Yandell, 2001).  
The interpretation of faith depends on its context, how this notion 
assimilates itself to derive specific meanings. Faith exists as a sense of 
attachment, a result of cognitive reasoning, or a form of the will. In 
relation to faith being inseparable from identity, it is important to point 
out that fixation which creates a single entity of identity and faith. 
Identity and faith are inseparable because faith is the center of any 
religion.  
The concept of faith differs with different ideologies. Therefore, it 
can easily be said that, for most people, identity works within the 
boundaries of faith. For the faithful, there cannot be anything rational 
beyond the marked outlines of faith. In most cases, identity and faith form 
one cohesive unit. Nevertheless, faith also creates\moulds\forms identity 
in such a way that a common faith often makes a coherent social group 
with a common religion (Weedon, 2004). Therefore, identity becomes 
hybrid; it assimilates various pieces of identifiers and creates one 
cohesive whole. This term, hybridity, becomes the only explanation of 
what a person becomes: a kind of centripetal force pulling everything 
towards its center and assimilating it into one unit. The identity of a 
Kalash, after conversion, becomes hybrid in every sense of the word.  
The Kalash faith is a combination of rituals, festivals, and 
mythology. They acknowledge a number of deities who rule in their 
respective domains. There is a creator god and a pantheon of local gods 
and goddesses. Shamans have a dominant role. A unique association of 
music, dance, and gods is found. The round drums, the sacrifice of goats, 
and wine are central to all religious ceremonies. There is a common belief 
in the mountain fairies known as pari.1 Their religion is closely related to 
the Vedic religions. Their rituals involve chanting, dancing, and music. 
                                                        
1 A Persian word for fairy. 
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From death of an old man to the celebrations at the festivals, music holds 
a central place. Religious ceremonies often involve sacrificing a goat and 
sprinkling its blood at the altar. The Kalash have received many 
influences from the pre-Islamic Nuristan. Purity is the fundamental 
aspect, just as in Hinduism. Women are considered impure during 
menstruation and childbirth. They need to be purified, for which there are 
various ceremonies. Their religion is bound to their culture. It rests in 
what they do in their daily lives. Whatever Kalash tales and folklore 
speak, what their legends and songs reflect, the way they fit into the 
social fabric, their myths of creation, their deities, and their demons all 
combine to form the faith of the individual Kalash. Therefore, when this 
faith alters, the ultimate result is the creation of a narrative that carries the 
event of conversion with it.  
Here, the question is when a Kalash’s identity becomes an issue, 
and at what point people need to secure their identity. The answer is 
simple: when identity is at stake or some crisis comes upon it. This crisis 
can be due to cultural invasion, modernity, or, in the Kalash’s case, the 
event of conversion.  
The connection between narrative and identity is peculiar. 
Narrative helps to document the identity and any change in it. Conversion 
is, in a way, an adoption of new rhetoric system that a narrative 
documents. Therefore, the converts need to publicly display their changed 
affiliations. Conversion cannot be a secret act, or so it is told to the 
converts. The open announcement of the conversion is a proof, a 
testimony. According to Rambo (1993),  
  
Testimony is the narrative witness of a person's conversion, and it 
entails two interacting processes: language transformation and 
biographical reconstruction. We have seen that conversion is in 
part the adoption of a new rhetoric or language system. Since 
language is a powerful tool for the transformation of one's 
consciousness and perception of the world, it is not surprising that 
testimony is the adaptation of this modified rhetoric to explain 
one’s conversion experience, to tell one’s own story (p. 137).  
 
Testimony by converts is a general declaration by them about not 
practising the old religion any longer. A change in religion also finds its 
outlet in the narration. An expression of faith in language becomes an 
expression of what people believe in. The language creates and manifests 
faith as an understandable entity. In such narratives, the newly acquired 
 




faith and molded identity form the outline. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
claim that there is a crucial and inseparable connection among faith, 
identity, and narrative. Without narration of it, identity would cease to 
exist (Weedon, 2004). 
An individual can create a text in relation to its context through a 
story. It also offers the capability to look at ambiguity and complexity 
that an individual faces in a social context. Narrative analysis takes a 
story as an object of study that can provide information about the 
transitions taking place. The stories can highlight the adjustments of an 
individual or a group to make sense in their lives, and can serve as means 
to relate them to the rest of the social sphere (Franzosi, 1998; Riessman, 
1993). 
 
The Constituents of Kalash Identity:  
The Meanings of Being a Kalash 
 
The Kalash culture has been the centre of fascination for tourists, 
anthropologists, and historians (Buneri, 2010; Jahangard, 2006; Newby, 
1958; Robertson, 1897). The word Kalash literally means the “wearers of 
black” (Barrington, Kendrick, & Schlagintweit, 2006; Jahangard 2006). 
Historically, there were two kafir2 tribes: the Red Kafirs of Nuristan, and 
the Black Kafirs of the southern part of District Chitral (Barrington, 
Kendrick, & Schlagintweit, 2006). The notion of being a Kalash does not 
appear too complicated when it narrows down to the essentialist identity 
                                                        
2 Kafir (Arabic:  kɑːfə[r]) comes from the Arabic root word K-F-R , which 
means “to cover up,” “deny,” or “reject.” The word is translated into English as 
“faithless,” “disbeliever,” “infidel,” “unbeliever,” “atheist,” or “ungrateful” (Cowan, 
1976; Farid, 2006). As Harper (2001) explains, the word is derived “from Arabic kafir 
‘unbeliever, infidel, impious wretch,’ with a literal sense of ‘one who does not admit the 
blessings of God,’ from kafara ‘to cover up, conceal, deny.’  It is used pejoratively and 
applied by Muslims to all non-Muslims. In this article, the word Kafir is used in two 
different ways: first, as an identity, and second, as a judgmental remark. In the case of 
use as the identity, the “K” of the word Kafir is capitalized. However, where kafir is 
used as a judgment, the “k” is lower case. That said, the word and its variations (kefir, 
kaffir, cafer) have been used differently in different cultures (“Kaffirs,” 1911). For 
example, “in Ottoman times it came to be used almost exclusively for ‘Christian.’ Early 
English missionaries used it as an equivalent of ‘heathen’ to refer to Bantus in South 
Africa (1792), from which use it came generally to mean ‘South African black’ 
regardless of ethnicity, and to be a term of abuse since at least 1934” (Harper, 2001). In 
South East Africa, it is a racial term first used by Somali and Arab traders to identify 
black natives. In Sri Lanka, the word is an ethnic identity for the descendants of 
Portuguese traders; such Sri Lankans are proud to be called Kaffir. 
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of being a kafir (infidel) (Issigonis, 2002). Kafir has become 
predominantly a highly contextualized term based upon the cultural 
practices of the Kalash. The term kafirs represents a cultural group whose 
social standards do not reflect a specific inclination. 
The Kalash, an ethnic group, live in three remote mountainous 
valleys in the north of Pakistan. In 1959, there were 10,000 people; 
currently the population is estimated to be 4,000 (Malik, 2006; Shah, 
2008). Their culture, changed very little over the past 3000 years (Malik, 
2006), will probably not survive beyond the next few generations, as 
modernity and missionaries are altering it. Recently, a few people have 
reported Kalash conversions (Malik, 2006; Parkes, 2000; Rana, 2011; 
Shah, 2008). If measured by such criteria as literacy, income, and health 
facilities, the quality of life of the Kalash is very low. However, their 
quality of life is not very much different from that of the average 
Pakistani (Naqvi, 1996). 
  The first documented exploration of Kafiristan was done by a 
British expedition led by Colonel William Lockhart in 1885 (Naqvi, 
1996, p. 676, n.1). They were followed in 1890 by S. G. Robertson, who 
in The Kafirs of the Hindukush3 (1897) presents the earliest description of 
Kalash conversions in his extensive study of Kalash history, geography, 
religion, practices, rituals, and conversions. The arrival of the Kalash in 
this area is debated among scholars (Barrington, Kendrick, & 
Schlagintweit, 2006; Jahangard, 2006; Newby, 1958). One suggestion is 
that the Kalash came from Afghanistan under threat of forced conversion 
by King Ameer Abdul Rehman (Jahangard, 2006). Another suggestion is 
that they are the descendants of a mixed race, the Tajiks, who once 
occupied the lowlands of Badakhshan, and that they were driven into 
these mountains over time (Holdich, 1896). Robertson (1897) suggests 
that they were slaves of the Red Kafirs, and to escape enslavement, they 
crossed the valleys and settled in what is known today as Kalash4 
(Robertson, 1897). Still another theory is that they descended from 
Bactrian colonies, and that many can boast of Greek ancestry (Denker, 
1981). Some, including the native Kalash themselves, believe that they 
are actually descendants of the injured soldiers of Alexander’s army who 
                                                        
3 This mountain range lies at the boarder of Pakistan and Afghanistan and extends 
towards India. The range culminates at the northern boarders of Pakistan, near Gilgit. 
This mountain range is called Hindukush in Pakistan and HinduRaj in India.  
4 The valley is called “Kalash Valley”: located at the southern gorges of Hindukush 
mountain range in the north of Pakistan in the District Chitral, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province.  
 




remained behind when he crossed the Hindukush (Barrington, Kendrick, 
& Schlagintweit, 2006; Holdich, 1896; Jahangard, 2006; Malik, 2006; 
Mayfield, 2008). Newby (1958) proposes that the Kafirs were already 
living there when Alexander the Great crossed the Hindukush; the 
stragglers from his army lived among them, hence their Greek ancestry. 
Rehman (2011) claims that the Kalash migrated to Chitral from 
Afghanistan roughly around the 2nd century BCE. Some historians have 
speculated that the Kalash migrated from Kafiristan5 because of the fear 
of forced conversions to Islam and settled in Chitral. Their ancestors 
migrated from a place they call T’siyam in their folk songs (Shah, 2008).  
Meanwhile, the Kalash remained as slaves of the “Mehtar of 
Chitral,”6 because at that time Chitral was a princely state, and the British 
had no part to play in its administration. Nothing changed after the British 
left the subcontinent in 1947. Chitral became part of independent 
Pakistan, but the only difference the Kafirs experienced after 
independence was that a Pakistani civil servant took charge. Later, in 
1969, Chitral ceased to be a princely state and the government took direct 
control of its administration. In 1972, the Mehtar, the ruler of Chitral, was 
denied the privilege to rule and the slavery of the Kalash ended (Osella & 
Soares, 2010). The “discovery” of the Kafirs led to a boom in tourism, 
and also brought in large numbers of Muslim missionaries who wanted 
them to convert. The effects of conversion were less visible because older 
Kalash converts were not only related by blood to the Kalash but tolerant 
to the extent that they even participated in their rituals. The distinct 
identity of the valleys thus continued, because the old converts still had 
much more in common with their Kalash fellows (Naqvi, 1996). When 
conversion was a relatively new phenomenon, these older converts shared 
a lot with their fellow tribesmen. One such example is “N2”7: he had 
converted almost twenty-four years before and he narrated that he had 






                                                        
5 The name is commonly given to three villages: Bumborait, Birir, Rambur. It can be 
roughly translated as “the dwelling place of Kafirs.”  
6 Mehtar was the title of the ruler of the princely state of Chitra, in which the research 
area is located; it means “king” in the Khowar language. 
7 Respondents are labelled N1 to N10. 
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The Present Study 
 
The study area was the Kalash village of Bumborait,8 where the 
government had built a primary school and a Bashaleni.9 The villagers’ 
main sources of income include agriculture, manual labor, livestock, and 
tourism. The people were very hospitable and, in fact, the sole source for 
identifying the converts. During the search for converts, which took most 
of the time, inhabitants guided the researcher towards a separate 
settlement. It became apparent, and later the data verified, that the 
community was separate and identified based on religion. The 
interviewed participants were not very well off. Few had received formal 
education and they had never been out of their village. All of them had 
been converted by the persuasion of the Tablighi Jama’at.10 
The selection of participants was random. They were not 
scrutinized according to a specific stratum of the community; rather, 
every convert who agreed was interviewed. Random selection ensured the 
objectivity of the research, because there was no influence of any kind in 
the selection of the converts for the interviews (Cox, 2001; Shkedi, 2005). 
A number of people were approached for the interviews. Out of 15 or so 
individuals, 10 agreed to be interviewed. Those who did not agree were 
occupied with other errands. Although it was thought necessary to include 
both male and female converts in the survey, only one woman was 
interviewed for two reasons. First, the Tablighi Jama’at consists of men, 
and due to cultural constraints, they cannot interact with women. 
Therefore, it is easier for them to interact only with Kalash men. As a 
result, the number of male converts is higher. By converting males, the 
Tablighi Jama’at can communicate with women of the respective 
household through the converts. Second, it is not permitted for women to 
interact with “other” men. Therefore, giving an interview to a male 
researcher was not possible. For the same reason, not a single married 
convert gave permission to interview his wife. On the last day, a local 
informant came with the news that one girl had agreed to be interviewed. 
Her unconverted parents had given their consent, though reluctantly. She 
                                                        
8 The largest Kalash village. 
9 Maternity home: a separate building exclusively reserved for menstruating and 
pregnant women. As a custom, the Kalash Kafir women spend the menstrual period, 
pregnancy, and up to forty days after childbirth, at this place until they are “purified.”  
10 The global Islamic missionary movement that is proselytizing and revivalist in its 
teachings. The focus of this organization is to urge Muslims to return to the orthodox 
Islam, and help others convert to Islam by Dawah (invitation). 
 
 




can in no way be understood as representative of all the women converts, 
but at least the interview provided a glimpse into what that specific 
woman experienced, and it is better to have one woman’s story rather 
than none at all. 
The research team consisted of two people: the researcher and a 
local informant. On average, the researcher was able to interview one 
respondent a day. Most of the interviews took place in the converts’ 
homes, beside a stream, or in the local mosques. Interviews were 
voluntary; respondents were free to respond or not to the questions. All 
interviewees went through the process by themselves. Interviews were in 
the form of semi-structured conversations. All respondents were asked a 
set of prearranged questions in the form of prompts. Most of the questions 
were open-ended. These prearranged questions helped to keep their 
stories on track. All respondents were provided with a relaxing 
environment and there were minimal external influences during the 
interviews. Despite these efforts, the responses were cluttered with extra 
information; the respondents were keen to include all the details of their 
conversion because nobody had ever asked them before. Hence, it was 
not possible to keep them to any time limit.  
The respondents’ stories were recorded with their consent, and 
they were informed about the expected use of their responses as the basis 
of an article. The reliability of the collected data could be guaranteed, 
because the researcher was in direct interaction with converts. This first-
hand experience and interaction helped the researcher know about the 
respondents’ views on conversion and he could clearly perceive 
respondents’ biases as well as their psychological and emotional states 
(Cortazzi, 2001; Herman & Vervaeck, 2005; Mertova & Webster, 2007).  
The interviews were conducted primarily in Urdu. However, as 
some of the older converts were not fluent in Urdu, the researcher 
arranged for assistance from a native speaker of their language, Khowar.11 
The converts narrated their conversion stories in Khowar; later, a 
translator helped to transcribe and translate the interviews. The responses 
of the converts were recorded as they were speaking, along with the 
translation of the responses by the native speaker. The use of the mediator 
was essential because of the researcher’s unfamiliarity with the native 
language, and mediation did not change the utterances much. The native 
speaker helped to translate the exact words and then gave a brief 
summary of what the respondent had said.  
                                                        
11 The language spoken in the District Chitral. 
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This method was used for several reasons. First, conversion is a 
whole process that encompasses both the individuals and their social 
sphere. Second, narrative responses to open-ended questions were the 
source of data, rather than questions with a limited number of options to 
answer. Narratives, as opposed to other approaches, provide a foundation 
to reveal the extensiveness of conversions. Therefore, for an analysis of a 
process as extensive and comprehensive as conversions, it was 
appropriate to use this method.  
 
Discussion and Data Analysis 
 
This study of the Kalash conversion narratives aims at providing 
information about the needs, differences, incidents, or motivations that 
force a Kalash to convert. What differences and commonalities did they 
find between the old and the new faith? The narratives provide an 
understanding of the community’s stance on conversions. The discussion 
points out the instances in the communal life of Kalash that compelled 
them to convert. 
The following table indicates information extracted from the 
respondents’ narratives: age, gender, marital status, number of children, 
modes of income, education, and the years since conversion. The ages of 
the converts ranged from 19 to 60. Most of the converts were married. 
They included two students, a landowner, labourers, shopkeepers, and an 
unemployed man. The table also highlights the number of years since the 
individuals had converted. They began to convert about 27 to 30 years 
ago when religious movements were rapidly growing in the country. The 
oldest convert, aged 60, accepted Islam around the same time. The table 
also shows the increase in conversions. The number of converts has been 








Table 1. Summary of Respondents 
  
R Age Gender Marital 
Status 
Children Income Education Years Since 
Conversion 
M F 
1 30 M M 2 2 Manual labour None 8 
2 50 M M 5 2 Agriculture, 
labour 
None 24 
3 65 M M 6 3 Land owner None 27 





5 40 M M 3 0 None None 10 
6 21 M S 0 
 
0 Shopkeeper None 14 









9 60 M M 2 2 Unemployed None 24 












The respondents’ narratives were conceived of as journeys of 
discovery. There were recurring references to becoming “pure” and 
“elevated.” Islam is not totally alien for the Kalash, as their community 
and “larger cultural group” has a significant number of practising 
Muslims. Most of the Kalash have Muslim friends, too. Sometimes, these 
friends instigate a conversion. After the visits of Tablighi Jama’at, the 
frequency of Muslim friends’ asking the Kalash to convert increased. The 
“friends” worked in liaison with the missionaries. These friends were also 
motivated by the missionaries’ highlighting the extent of spiritual benefits 
that they would receive in this life and the afterlife for helping.  
  When asked about why they thought that their pre-conversion 
lives were no different from their present lives, their responses pointed to 
the extent of social interaction, not religion, suggesting that the most 
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important aspect of their lives was social interaction. For example, they 
maintained that it did not matter what religion they practised; the 
important thing was that they still belonged to the same community, and 
still joined their relatives in the annual celebrations. While they all acted 
differently in the religious sense, they had not totally lost their familial 
ties. The community, on the other hand, had come up with a working 
strategy to incorporate a sense of belonging with their “displaced” 
relatives. Even those converts who did not attend the annual celebrations 
and were contemptuous towards the practices still maintained interaction 
with their community and relatives. The converts may have denied the old 
ways, but they were still part of the family.  
All converts used the word “unclean” to describe their previous 
religious practices. Whether they were talking about their motivation or 
explaining Islam, in both cases, the representation of the hygienic and the 
unhygienic served as a yardstick. The source of this vocabulary was 
Islamic discourse, as they looked at their previous lives under the 
magnifying glass of Islam. The whole discourse narrowed down to one 
idea, indoctrinated by the missionaries, which enabled them to construct a 
reality that satisfied their subjective urges. 
The converts looked at their pre-conversion lives as a time when 
they were “not adhering to moral or ethical practices” (N1, N2, N9, N10). 
It was a time when the converts were jahil (ignorant), living lives of 
personal disorder (N6). It is important to note that the practices only 
became “immoral” after conversion, hence a highlighted reason behind 
their conversion. Their “personal disorder” was because of their indulging 
in activities that were “sinful” and a “deliberate violation of moral 
norms.” The whole paradigm of moral and immoral was turned upside 
down. The converts referred to their previous lives as living in dishonour 
(darkness) and moral degradation (N1, N7, N6). Most of the converts 
were contemptuous because they were not as “hygienic” and 
“honourable” as they became after accepting Islam. “Hygienic” was the 
most frequently used word in the narratives of the Kalash. The differences 
between the unhygienic (filthy) and the hygienic were understood by 
them as the main difference between the old and new religions: as a 
binary opposition. The converts referred to the performing of ablutions 
(washing) that Islam emphasizes.  
The Kafir Kalash also traditionally accentuate purity but it is 
something that is achieved with elaborate ceremonies in the presence of a 
shaman. Islam, on the other hand, offers the chance to become pure just 
through a ritual cleaning, which is why the converts emphasized personal 
 




hygiene as a merit of the new religion. However, purity and hygiene are 
essentially two different concepts: purity is something built in, a state of 
being, an honour or a privilege, whereas hygiene is something achievable. 
A comb is considered impure; no matter what you do, it will always 
remain impure. Women are not allowed to enter the place of worship 
(Jestagan) because they are considered essentially impure. Islam provides 
them with a chance to “cleanse” themselves of this religiously forced 
impure state.  
The stories of the converts had economic undertones: the job they 
were doing before and after conversion, their source of income, their 
standard of living, the amount of their debts, and how conversion did or 
did not make a change in their economic situation (N1, N6, N8, N9, N10). 
In essence, the motivation behind their conversion was the possibility of 
improving their financial status/situation. The extent of economic 
betterment was always interpreted as a blessing of the new religion. Some 
of the converts were disillusioned with the new religion because of not 
experiencing the desired benefits (N5, N7). Others directly associated 
their improved economic situation as an uninterrupted result of 
conversion (N2, N8).  
All the converts were in favour of a morality which would not 
serve as retaliation for their previous lives. They believed that conversion 
would erase their previous “ignorant follies.” In this way, converts could 
now decontaminate themselves from their previous “sins” rather than 
worry about the punishment. The promise that their previous “sins” 
would be forgiven was a charming one. Moreover, they would be as 
“sinless” as a newborn baby (N1, N3, N5, N7). The new religion offered 
them a chance to be “elevated” and “purified.” Their narratives are 
marked with the notion of benevolence in both of the worlds. 
The converts were placated with the notion that after conversion 
they would no longer suffer: Allah had a special place for them where 
they would live for eternity (N1, N8, N9). It satisfied the converts. They 
would not have been worthy of going into the jannat12 had they still been 
a kafir, because it is reserved for only the “chosen ones.” This narrows 
down, arguably, to the fundamental reason behind almost all of the 
conversions: the utility a religion promises. The promise serves its 
purpose very well: to inspire, motivate, and convert. The Kalash imagined 
Muslims as higher in status both religiously and socially. The rest of the 
Muslim community reinforced this idea with qualifications from the 
                                                        
12 According to Islamic teaching, jannat (Paradise) is a place where the righteous will 
dwell for eternity. 
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Quran, the traditions, and general belief. Therefore, conversion looked 
charming because it might give them a chance to become “equal in 
status.” In theory, Islam believes in, and propagates, equality. However, 
the converts were still not considered equal. There is a stereotype— 
Sheikh—for the ones who converted. A local village where the converts 
live is called Sheikha’nanda: the living place of Sheikhs. The “stigma” of 
having once been a kafir never leaves them. They are still considered low 
in status because of their Kafir lineage—but slightly more equal than the 
non-converts. 
Converts, before conversion, are made to believe that they are 
filthy kafirs, pagans, impure and unclean. They are made to believe that 
their religion is not valid, their beliefs precarious, their prayers useless. 
By undertaking conversion, they have a chance to let go of all these 
stigmas; revive and revitalize themselves by achieving “one” “pure” and 
“just” religion. Therefore, conversion is never given as a mere option, but 
as solution to their current state.  
 
The Conversion Incident 
 
Conversion is a complex phenomenon: it involves continuity and 
modification, association and dissociation, at times involuntary. It looks 
back, and at the same time, it looks forward to a journey whose meanings 
change with the passage of time and from person to person. The event of 
conversion is a point of change in a continuum. The life of a convert 
alters because one of the facets of identity alters, and with that, the 
convert’s complete social status revolutionizes. The event of conversion 
becomes a reference point after which all converts identify and situate 
themselves. The convert is now ready to assimilate/internalize the 
distinction between “us” and “them.” Conversion to Islam presents one of 
the best empirical grounds to explore some of the dichotomies involving 
Islam and the Kafirs.  
Conversion in women typically occurs because of love.13 Converts 
and non-converts alike narrate this as fact (although our female convert 
did not substantiate this claim, since she was unmarried). When a man 
chooses to speak for a woman of his culture, it signifies the woman’s 
lower status or subdued gender role. Even though there was not any 
significant evidence of this motivation behind the Kalash women’s 
conversions, it was a generally believed and accepted reality. It was 
                                                        
13 Interestingly, however, there was one woman subject in this study, and she was 
unmarried. 
 




observed that when the male spouse converted, the wife also accepted the 
faith, because she could not live without the support of her husband. 
Choosing the new religion was not really a choice for the women; rather, 
invisible social and emotional pressures pushed them to convert. The 
economic, social, and emotional dependency of the women helped the 
men to manipulate their decisions. Ironically, the missionaries, while 
maintaining that the women were neither influenced nor forced to 
convert, considered their conversion valid.  
Kalash women and men interact freely. Marriage by the Kalash 
takes place mostly with the consent of both partners. With free choice, a 
Kalash woman can also choose a Muslim man as her husband. After this 
choice, conversion becomes necessary. In situations in which a Kalash 
woman was in love with a Muslim man, conversion was said by one 
respondent to be the only solution for their union (N2). Tourists with 
minimal knowledge of the Kalash identity have also initiated the 
conversions. The Kalash also think that Muslims lure women into a 
relationship, but when their curiosity ends, they leave them unattended. 
Sometimes they get married but due to cultural differences, they cannot 
maintain a family and at last, these women are divorced. They return to 
their parents’ home and live the life of a rejected person who does not 
belong to either community. Neither the converts nor the missionaries 
acknowledged this disturbing outcome of their enthusiastic efforts.  
There are significant examples that reveal the social rejection of 
the converts that varies from none to complete, from the indifference of 
relatives to the excommunication of the convert. For some converts, only 
the parents refused to live with them (N4); others fainted from the fear of 
rejection (N6), yet some faced utter rejection from their family (N1, N2, 
N3, N6, N7, N9). However, this rejection was mostly not final. Some 
believed that Islam was nothing more than a “slightly different set of 
beliefs”; such members of Kalash society emphasized that they saw no 
reason for opposing conversion.  
Usually, the female converts are immediately sent to a madrasah 
for “religious education.” In other words, the process of indoctrination of 
fundamental Islamic values formally begins. This sudden shift of status, 
from a kafir Kalash girl to a Muslim Kalash girl, is overwhelmingly 
welcoming. Mostly, the conversions occur on the festival of the Sixteenth 
of May (Joshi: the annual spring festival that, after a long winter, brings 
life and hope to the Kalash). Usually, at the time of the festival, the 
women are free to convert, because it is the occasion when a married 
Kalash woman can choose a new husband if she is not happy with her 
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previous one. It is also the time when an unmarried woman can declare 
her liking for a Muslim or Kalash man.  
Conversion for the Kalash is sometimes, at first, an experimental 
process. Later, this experimentation becomes a permanent change when it 
is accepted deliberately and consciously. It is an innovation, where 
individuals need to re-introduce themselves to a different morality and 
work towards the development of association with the “other ideas.” One 
convert said, “after suffering with insanity, my wife and I thought of 
converting. We thought that it might change our circumstances and may 
result in a cure of my wife” (N3). 
The “real crisis” resulting in conversion can be, first, an internal 
crisis, when one “experiences a need” to convert because of some 
subjective motive. Second, it can come externally, when one's beliefs are 
molded or transformed by a preacher. Conversion was “a well thought out 
act” for several respondents (N1, N3, N4, N5, N9, N10), and they had “no 
other manipulation.” It was “nothing more or less, but God’s blessings” 
(N1, N2, N3, N8), converts maintained. However, their extreme 
indoctrination by the preacher ensured that the conversion event was 
inevitably reconstructed into a perception that they had chosen the new 
religion freely. Imagine ten people converted in separate instances 
becoming so “in-tune” that each made exactly the same statement. No 
convert could think independently or critically, hence could not decide for 
themselves. Their decision was not independent, even if they said it was. 
They were the perfect subjects of power structures: not questioning 
authority, but rather accepting it as it was presented. The converts 
cherished themselves as the chosen ones because they were told they 
were.  
The people of Tablighi Jama’at were looked at as the men of God, 
and so the converts took the word of the preacher for the word of God. 
Whatever the people of the Tablighi Jama’at told them, the converts 
believed, because they were assumed to be the ones who could 
understand and convey the message of God. “The people of Jama’at carry 
the word of God with them, God speaks through them.” Such a belief 
among the converts led to an unshakeable surrender to the people who 
had brought the word. Kalash converts took the new faith as an obligation 
because now God Himself had sent a person with His word (N1, N2, N6, 
N8, N9). One respondent stated, in response to a question about his 
conversion incident, “Some people from Jama'at came and invited me to 
join new faith they told me that it is a ‘religion of light’ and cleanliness, 
 




so Allah gave me hidayat (guidance)” (N7). This simple statement shows 
the docility of a convert, and the intensity of the preacher’s manipulation.  
Will was necessary for the final decision of the individual to 
convert; however, it was not free will. Physical, psychological, and 
emotional realities were now looked at by the converts from a new 
perspective, even if there was no stereotyping, social victimization, a real 
urge to convert, to feel elevated/happy, or any disillusionment with the 
previous religion, yet these reasons for conversion were presented (N5, 
N6, N7, N9, and N10). Converts, to express their reality, adopted the 




After conversion, the very first thing converts do is draw a line 
between “us” and “them”: converts and non-converts, Muslims and 
kafirs, the chosen ones and the ones cursed for eternity. Soon after, 
converts learn that anyone having different beliefs from their own is 
wrong and immoral, because the new religion has highlighted and 
enforced the difference. The very reason for the religion reaching the 
converts in the first place was this difference. Then the religious discourse 
made the convert feel disgust for those who were “immoral.” Conversion 
has become the reason for the clash in the otherwise harmonious society. 
The new religion is promoting hatred and violence. The ideas clash with 
previous norms. Dangerously, all the converts thought this division 
natural. N1 said, “We ate Haram and did Haram [forbidden acts] but, 
after conversion, the difference between Haram and Halal [permissible] is 
clear.” According to N2, after conversion the change was that 
 
I pray and do whatever people perform in the mosque. I don’t go 
to that place where they slaughter or in their festivals. I will pray 
five times, go to Tabligh, will not eat Haram, will eat Halal, will 
not eat whatever they slaughter, will eat anything that is Halal. I 
will only eat that animal which I will slaughter with my own 
hands. Whatever Allah has permitted and is written in Quran, will 
give Zakat and all. 
 
 In the opinion of N5, “Kalash are not only Kafirs but also very 
‘unhygienic’ people. This is the reason (being filthy) for not going into 
the cultural activities.” Similarly, N10 said: “I never felt any need to join 
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the ‘filthy’ Kalash. Their practices are ‘filthy,’ ‘immoral,’ and ‘un-
Islamic.’” 
The Kalash converts repeatedly used such words as 
“clear/enlightened” (roshan), “hygienic” (sufa, saaf), “beneficial” (faida), 
and “peace” (sukoon) to talk about life after conversion. The frequency of 
such words was very high. It can have multiple interpretations. First, the 
respondents may have had a problem in translating their mother tongue in 
Urdu. To counter this problem they started using the language and 
vocabulary of the people who brought the faith. They may not have been 
able to find appropriate words to express their thoughts exactly, and as a 
result, they learned all the words that might carry a shadow of what they 
wanted to express. Second, the converts were very vulnerable, and the 
missionaries did not possess the expertise and understanding of the 
problems an individual might face while communicating in another 
language with a separate discourse. Therefore, converts appropriated the 
language of Tablighi Jama’at, to the extent of mimicry. They were 
provided with a limited number of possible meanings. The understanding 
of the language in these particular instances therefore became loaded, 
hegemonic: a convert received something beneficial (faida) as he 
received the faith. A blessing was something reserved for the convert 
after receiving the faith. The word “blessing” (rehmat) has many 
interpretations, too. Here, language has become the instrument of 
propaganda. The converts had not only acquired the essential vocabulary, 
with very limited understanding, but also kept repeating it. They never 
used the words “creatively.” Their understanding was limited to 
performing the “rituals” rightly.  
N6 insisted, “Now my converted life is better I have seen some 
‘light’ and my heart is at peace. I thank Allah that I am spending my life 
in a good manner.” The problem with words, in this context, like “light,” 
“at peace,” and “better” is that all such terms are used subjectively. 
Consequently, interpretation is difficult. We can only deduce the meaning 
by guessing the person’s intention as best we can, in the context of the 
person’s social “reality.” The change the convert was talking about was in 
religion, which subsequently led to a change in behaviour. The personal 
attitudes, morals, world view, and social understanding of the convert 
altered, no doubt, but the “real” change for the convert was in the extent 
of his social interaction with his community. By not admitting this new 
“reality,” the convert was unconsciously trying to justify his decision by 
maintaining that the change in religion had not led to anything different. 
 




The convert was in denial, hence the persistent stance that there had not 
been any change in his life.  
The next stage of conversion is the commitment, devotion, 
attachment, and faithfulness to the new religion. The commitment of the 
convert is voluntary surrender, whereby the individual “willingly” accepts 
the new faith. “Surrender” is the inner process of commitment and is one 
of the most difficult aspects of conversion to understand, and is also, 
according to Rambo (1993), “very likely the aspect hardest for a convert 
to achieve in any lasting, pervasive sense” (p. 132). This observation was 
confirmed by the converts themselves (N1, N2, N3, N6, N9, N10) as they 
explained, “Religion is not an easy task, it’s too much hard work look at 
the companions of the prophet, they too suffered.”  
There is another side to this as well. If a convert decided to revert, 
the larger social sphere would never allow it. In one instance, a convert 
decided to return to his old faith. The Muslims, after hearing this, started 
to protest; the effigies and other sacred images of the Kalash were burned 
or destroyed. The reverted convert had to be declared a lunatic, who was 
unaware of his social condition, hence not accountable for what he said or 
did. So there is an unseen force, the intimidation of social pressure, that 
never permits democratic liberty for the converts. Once a convert, always 
a convert. 
Conversion leads to extreme self-consciousness; the converts now 
act in accordance with the Islamic norms because they are supposed to act 
this way. Those who achieved the desired results were content, while for 
others, the expectations after conversion were not fulfilled. Such converts 
were not satisfied with their conversion. They, however, could not choose 
to revert. Some of the converts said that their lives had not changed after 
conversion because it did not bring any material “benefits.” Some 
benefits of conversion were seen to be the birth of children (N7) or 
economic stability (N3, N4, N6, N8, N9, N10). This utilitarianism was 
also consistent in their narratives. One of the reasons behind their 
conversion was the registration of the “fact” that they would have the 
favors of the almighty in the afterlife. The virtuousness of the new 
religion, therefore, was seen by some converts to be its utility in this 
world and the world after. 
The most abrupt change after conversion was alienation from the 
culture. In all the cases, rejection was from the family, primarily the 
father as head of the family. The initial anger of the father (or elder 
brother and other members of the family) was part of the narration of 
every convert. The parents’ angry reaction was because the conversion 
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posed a challenge to the social hierarchy in which they were the central 
authority figures in any given family. “My will is followed in my house,” 
said N2; “My children must surrender to it.” Sometimes, the Muslim 
community registered the family reaction. For example, N6 said, 
  
In the Shahi mosque, after Friday prayers I went towards the 
Imam and declared that I wanted to become a Muslim. The Imam 
asked me about my family and after knowing that my parents 
were still Kalash the Imam refused because of the possible 
reaction from my family. I was so angry over Imam’s refusal that 
I cursed him and thought of not converting at all. 
  
After conversion, converts experienced social alienation hand in 
hand with hybridity. A Kalash was now a Muslim, too, no longer a kafir. 
It was the new identity: a combination of both worlds entangled in a 
complex association. The weight of ancestral religious understanding in 
relation to the new ideas was now in a complex interplay with everything 
else. The newly converted individuals had to mimic the previous norm 
(N1, N8). In this way, converts could ensure the continuity of relations 
with their family. The cultural fabric could be re-knit; older affiliations 
were no longer valid, but they did not cease to exist (N1, N2, N5, N8, N9, 
N10). 
Socially, life after conversion brought happiness because converts 
were made to believe their decision was valid. This feeling came from 
interaction with the other, relatively larger, Muslim social circle in which 
conversions were a celebrated event. N8 said, “I got a lot; found a lot, 
understood a lot, felt a lot.” He further added, “I felt that I found a lot of 
friends I went through very drastic changes, I suddenly learnt that all of 
my prayers were being heard.” By converting, they attained the status of 
being “normal” within the larger social group. Now, they were no longer 
contemptible, “ignorant,” and “disgustingly dirty” kafirs. The larger part 
of society could easily adopt them—but only for a limited time. Some 
converts complained about negligence in the behaviour of Muslims. 
When you convert, “the Muslims celebrate but later they forget you” (N1, 
N3, N6, N8). Despite having converted, they could not get rid of the 
stigma of Kafir identity, because now they would be called “Sheikhs,” a 
title identifying them as converts. The stigma of having a family that is 
still kafir never leaves the converts. 
Marriage became a complicated issue for couples after one of 
them converts. Because Islam does not acknowledge a marriage between 
 




a Muslim and a non-Muslim, marriages became void after conversion 
(N2, N3, N8, N10). This “normal” status was dictated by the new 
religion. If one of the spouses converted, the other had to convert, too, or 
they would no longer be able to live together (N2, N3, N8). This is how 
the logic of power works: at one end, you are a morally degraded outcast, 
but if you choose to be one of “the high caste,” you must accept the 
progression of the morality of the powerful in your personal matters. You 
do not have a choice.  
Contemporary Islamic missionaries have begun to gather 
influence in areas like Kafiristan. This outside influence has led to the 
increase of conversion among the native people. The individual Kalash 
converts adopt a new set of beliefs with the old ones to form an 
association in between. As a result, they produce new, hybrid social 
realities. During this process the whole reality of a convert becomes 
labyrinthine. Conflict is an appropriate word for what a convert goes 
through. Social violence and religious pressure result in converts making 
decisions that they would not have made otherwise.  
 
This article has analyzed the life narratives of some of the Kalash 
converts: their motivations, the changes in their behaviours at social and 
emotional levels, the outcomes of their conversion, racial and 
geographical elements for determining the old and new identities, their 
efforts to readjust, and the reasons for alienation from the existing culture.  
The researcher has looked at the conversion as a process, which does not 
occur in isolation. It is a social event and a multidimensional progression. 
It is a time-bound incident, a social reaction, a psychological 
understanding, a physical elevation, a spiritual experience, an acceptance 
of a metaphysical reality, and a change in identity.  
The act of changing a specific religious conviction has a number 
of motivational forces. For some it is economic; for others it is a different 
social or a spiritual experience, a call from the divine; and for others it is 
simply an act to fit into the larger cultural group. Different converts gave 
different reasons for their conversion. For some kafir Kalash, the already 
existing religion had become unacceptable, on account of its being 
immoral, unethical, filthy, unhygienic, obscure, and unnatural, resulting 
in an attitude where the conversion seemed, from the individual converts’ 
perspective, inevitable. Furthermore, the Kalash were made to think of 
themselves after conversion as elevated or blessed as compared to the rest 
of their social sphere. However, some of the converts were disillusioned 
with the new religion because of its not being able to satisfy their needs. 
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Nevertheless, the social pressure/new religion never let them “stray.” 
They could not revert even if they wanted to. The religious institutions 
established this sense of elevation or superiority, which resulted in the 
creation of a situation in which individuals no longer associated with their 
social sphere. They were made to believe themselves inferior. Therefore, 
to become superior, they converted.  
Their conversion narratives showed that their motivation was not 
intellectual or theoretical, a personal investigation of faith that resulted in 
transformation. The individuals had a lot of external influence but there 
was no “ecstatic awakening.” The motivation behind conversion and 
resulting narratives were based on intense emotions, where the 
individuals tried to find the truth and related their findings to divine 
blessings. A certain level of affection of individuals for the followers of 
the new religion helped in their transformation—for example, a convert 
took interest in the practices of a religion or a friend instigated the 
conversion—but for the most part, the outside motivation came from the 
powerful arguments of the preaching missionaries (Tablighi Jama’at).  
The conversions in Kalash were neither experimental nor strictly 
spiritual; rather, a promise of utility was consistent. Some thought it 
would be better for their health, mental or physical, to convert; others 
found inspiration from the person who was once their boss. The converts 
also reported that they had converted because they thought that their 
economic conditions would become better. Some others thought 
conversion had resulted in their having healthy children. 
Conversion is like a rupture in a person’s life. It is a 
transformation on the personal, social, psychological, and emotional 
levels; therefore, one cannot expect to sustain the existing social status in 
reality. Conversion causes ideological alterations, with the disposing of 
old gods so that they can assimilate the new. A change in faith, for a 
Kalash, results in an immediate change in the status of the paraphernalia. 
For example, a Kalash individual has to conceive the idea of an 
omnipotent and omniscient God who commands all, and cannot be 
perceived in opposition to physically present gods. A Kalash woman now 
looks for help from Allah (God) rather than the goddess Dizalak for a safe 
childbirth. Converts have to internalize the differences of ideas between 
the two religions. They have to understand the difference between these 
ideas, and why one is more relevant to their life then the other.  
A conversion narrative is an expression of a modification in 
“identity”: Kalash converts have to deal with intricate relationships 
between religion and their identity and all those elements that contribute 
 




to make the identity, as a single differentiable unit. Conversion results in 
creation of such an individual who is characterized by the display of a 
new religion plus an old identity.  
Conversion and continuation: an individual convert makes efforts 
to carry on in the same social sphere. Converts go through a number of 
adjustments to achieve successful assimilation with the new society, such 
as the creation of a narrative that will help them to make sense out of the 
changes that have occurred around them. Hence, a narrative turns out to 
be, simultaneously, an assimilation and a means of association. Some of 
the converts tried to make friends with the non-converts; others tried to 
adopt the prevailing norm to fit in. They attended the kafir festivals, not 
only to show their tolerance, but also from an urge to stay connected with 
their culture, and to be accepted as an individual of a different faith. 
Previously, their common religion was the base upon which their 
relations were acceptable. Once their religion changed, it affected their 
relations, too. Their narratives highlighted that the new faith was the 
source of social cohesion in a different community.  
There were recurrent expressions of becoming superior after 
converting to Islam. The conversion occurred mostly to a Sunni 
denomination. The whole discourse also found its way into the narratives. 
The people were not interested in any other denomination; rather, they 
pronounced followers of other denominations infidels (kafir). The 
conversion itself becomes a violent act when the converts, having been 
kafir themselves, start after conversion to consider the other sects of Islam 
as kafir. The reasons are essentially the same: followers of other 
denominations observe slightly different sets of beliefs.  
The Kalash society has so far managed to live in peace, but 
tensions could be felt in the narratives and the attitude of people towards 
others. For example, some Kalash complained about attacks on their 
religious sites and the destruction of their sacred effigies. Muslims of the 
surrounding areas also did not accept the converts as their “fellows,” 
equal in “status.” A stereotype of “Sheikh” was used to identify the 
converts. Looking at the narrations of the actual incidents of conversion, 
it is apparent that converts did not focus on the incident of religious 
change. The entire narratives were divided into before and after. The 
inquiry revealed that there were some classic examples of incidents 
associated with religious change (falling unconscious, being peaceful, and 
rebirth).  
The data shows that there is no evidence of women converting 
because of the urge to be married to a Muslim, though some unconverted 
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Kalash claimed this to be true. When the converts thought about 
converting, they received most of their help from the people of Tablighi 
Jama’at. The converts never tried to learn from books on Islam because 
most of them were illiterate. Even the literate ones never consulted books. 
Most of the conversions took place in mosques. The converts thought of 
the mosques as the only place where they could visit and receive the new 
faith. The majority of the converts faced a negative attitude from their 
families, although for some the initial negative attitude subsided. The 
negative attitude was usually reserved for the males. All of the converts 
insisted on being identified as Kalash Muslims. The converts also stated 
that they must separate themselves from the kafir community, both in 
social relations and dwellings, but as this was impossible for all the 
converts, they continued to have social relations with their old 
communities. 
The conversion narratives showed that one of the major factors 
behind acceptance and rejection of an individual was religion. The other 
factors performed interdependently with religion because religion served 
as the foundation for the formation of such cultural groups as the Kalash. 
Alteration of the basic structural unit of religion resulted in different 
modifications in the behaviour of individual converts. These 
modifications in the converts’ behaviour were a source of the contempt 
for the kafir Kalash community and affection for the Muslim side. The 
modified behaviors of the converts made the whole “social building” 
shatter. This behavioural change is subjective in nature because all 
individuals look at the “issue” from their own perspectives and interpret 
events according to their own understanding. In this case, the Kalash 
individuals leave their religion and choose to follow Islam. The resultant 
narrative marks and creates the boundaries of difference and association 
between the social sphere and individual being. Their narratives also 
highlighted their conversion in an intact tribal society, which brought the 
converts and their society in opposition to each other. The converts turned 
out to be single detached beings with no grounds to attach themselves to 
the prevailing social sphere. The Kalash community is physically together 
but religiously separate. The people interact, but their contempt towards 
the Other is there. One can feel the acuteness of the separation of 
individuals from the rest of the community, which did care about the 
ideas of a religion and the consequences of being different.  
Finally, many NGOs are in the region with a promise of 
development and growth, and a desire to maintain the religious minority 
status of Kalash. The NGOs have brought with them foreign standards of 
 




“development and growth” (Parkes, 2000). People have started to adopt 
these standards so that they can experience the perception of being 
“developed.” This idea of development has served as a front for the 
missionaries, resulting in a conflict between positivist and fundamentalist 
ideologies. The Kalash are caught in the middle. Such efforts have also 
made the Kalash believe in the foreigners’ idea of what it means to be a 
Kalash. Both ideas, in essence, are foreign. They should not have to be 
anything because of any kind of foreign subjective understanding. 
Nevertheless, the influence is overwhelmingly visible. The Kalash have 
started to see themselves not as they are, but as others see them. The 
NGOs want to keep the Kalash individuality and offer incentives for that, 
but the missionaries want to include them in the mainstream.  
In this research, it is important to point to the role that the 
Muslims have played to facilitate the conversions. The people of jama’at 
are Muslim but the Muslim friends and acquaintances living in the 
vicinity have frequently been a source of the decision to convert. The 
friends and relatives were often seen to instigate the conversion of the 
unconverted Kalash. Probably the biggest difficulty faced by the Kalash 
converts has been full recognition and acceptance within the Muslim 
community, as they have had to overcome the prejudices and cultural 
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